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A CASE FOR REVISITING THE  
CHILD WELFARE ACT 
Abstract: In 2017, in D.O. v. Glisson, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit held that the Child Welfare Act of 1980 (the “Act”) creates a 
privately enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments and that this 
right could be enforced by an individual through the use of § 1983. In a simi-
lar case, Midwest Foster Care and Adoption Ass’n v. Kincade, the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that the Act does not create a privately enforceable right and thus, 
could not be enforced through the use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Comment ar-
gues that the Eighth Circuit’s determination is correct with respect to the fac-
tors presented by the Supreme Court in 1997, in Blessing v. Freestone. It is 
likely that Congress did not intend for the Act to have no means of enforce-
ment; therefore, the Act needs to be amended. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, in D.O. v. Glisson, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit held that the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare 
Act of 1980 (the “Act”) produces a private right to foster care maintenance 
payments and that this private right can be enforced using 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.1 In Glisson, two young boys were removed from their mother’s 
home and placed in the care of their mother’s aunt.2 The aunt filed suit 
against the Secretary of Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health and Family Services 
(the “Secretary”) after being denied foster care maintenance payments.3 The 
Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in fa-
vor of the state of Kentucky and, in doing so, created a split with the Eighth 
                                                                                                                           
 1 D.O. v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 375–76 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 316 (2017) 
(reversing the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky by ruling 
that the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (the “Act”) created a private-
ly enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments which can be enforced through the use of 
42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 2 Id. at 376. 
 3 Id. One specific part of the Act outlines a mechanism in which states give foster care parents 
“foster care maintenance payments” and the state can later be reimbursed by the federal govern-
ment if the state follows certain guidelines. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a) (2012). Foster care maintenance 
payments serve the purpose of bolstering the foster family’s income in order to better take care of 
the foster child. Id. § 675(4)(A). The payment includes money to cover the cost of, among other 
things, food, clothing, shelter, and daily supervision. Id. The foster care maintenance payments are 
a small part of a larger plan which is approved by the Secretary of Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health 
and Family Services (the “Secretary”). Id. § 671(a). The Secretary oversees the administration of 
the Act; therefore, the children’s aunt filed suit against the Secretary to ensure enforcement of the 
Act. Id. § 676; see Glisson, 847 F.3d at 376. 
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Circuit.4 The Supreme Court recently denied a Petition for Writ of Certiora-
ri.5 In 2013, in Midwest Foster Care and Adoption Ass’n v. Kincade, the 
Eighth Circuit held that the Act failed to create a privately enforceable right 
and that the Act cannot be enforced using § 1983.6  
 This Comment analyzes the arguments of both the Sixth and Eighth 
Circuits.7 Part I provides a detailed background of the Act, explains what is 
needed to create a privately enforceable right, and discusses the rebuttable 
presumption of § 1983 enforceability.8 Part II details the apparent split be-
tween decisions from the Sixth and Eighth Circuits.9 Part III analyzes the 
circuit split and ultimately finds that because the intent of Congress does 
not align with the proper analysis of the statute, this issue should be left 
alone by the courts and given to Congress to fix.10 
I. HOW IS A PRIVATE RIGHT CREATED, AND WHAT  
PART DOES § 1983 PLAY? 
Section A of this Part develops and discusses the history of the Act.11 
Section B discusses what is necessary for a right to be deemed a “privately 
enforceable right.”12 Section C explains the presumption of § 1983 enforce-
ability once a right is deemed to be a privately enforceable right.13  
A. The Act 
The safety and welfare of the nation’s children has long been a goal of 
Congress.14 In 1935, Congress passed the Social Security Act, providing 
federal funds to states to encourage them to participate in a variety of dif-
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Glisson, 847 F.3d at 376 (contrasting with the Eighth Circuit’s decision in which the 
court held that the Act is a privately enforceable right); Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass’n v. 
Kincade, 712 F.3d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that the Act is not a privately enforceable 
right). 
 5 Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 375–76, cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 316. 
 6 Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1194. 
 7 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 376; Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1203. 
 8 See infra notes 11–51 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 55–103 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 104–129 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 14–25 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 26–37 and accompanying text.  
 13 See infra notes 38–51 and accompanying text. 
 14 See HOUSE WAYS & MEANS COMM., Child Welfare Legislative History, in GREEN BOOK 
(2012), http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/2012-green-book/chapter-11-child-welfare/
legislative-history [https://perma.cc/4XW9-5RPJ] (presenting background material and data on the 
major U.S. entitlement programs). The protection of children as an objective of federal policy 
noticeably began in 1912 when Congress created the Federal Child’s Bureau, initiated to “investi-
gate and report” matters dealing with child welfare and safety. Id. 
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ferent welfare systems.15 In 1980, Congress enacted Title IV-E of the Social 
Security Act, otherwise known as the Act.16 The Act regulates the state-
managed foster care and adoption systems for children who are removed 
from the homes of their families and details the process in which “foster 
care maintenance payments” are provided to families who take in foster 
care children.17 The purpose of the Act is to equip states to support foster 
care families and children during the child’s journey into their foster care 
home and also to encourage movement within the foster care system.18 
The Act outlines three important steps that states must follow in order to 
be eligible for reimbursement.19 First, each state must submit and approve a 
proper plan to the Secretary of Health and Human Services.20 A proper plan 
must contain thirty-six features that force a specific level of state oversight by 
requiring, among other things, that local level programs are coordinated with 
state programs and that the state monitor and evaluate foster care activities.21 
If the plan does not lay out all thirty-six features and the state fails to correct 
the plan, then the government will withhold federal funding.22 Second, each 
state must provide “foster care maintenance payments” for each child who 
has been taken from the home of a relative and assigned into the foster care 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See id. (showing that beginning in 1935 there were multiple additions and amendments to 
the Social Security Act that were aimed primarily at increasing the amount of funding states were 
receiving to help protect children and also increasing the number of children that were eligible for 
help). 
 16 See 42 U.S.C. § 670 (2012) (declaring that the purpose of Title IV-E is to enable states to 
provide for foster care children and to authorize the appropriations that would be paid to the 
states). 
 17 See id. (declaring congressional purpose); id. § 672(a) (explaining the eligibility require-
ments for the state, foster care placement, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and alien 
children). Title IV-E of the Social Security Act covers the entirety of the Act, and within Title IV-
E, there are many different sections pertaining to different parts of the Act. Id. §§ 670–679(c). 
 18 Id. § 670. The Act served to “establish a program of adoption assistance, to strengthen the 
program of foster care assistance for needy and dependent children, to improve the child welfare, 
social services, and aid to families with dependent children programs, and for other purposes.” 
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 670–679(c)). 
 1942 U.S.C. §§ 672, 674(a). 
 20 Id. § 671(a). 
 21 Id. § 671(a)(1)–(36). These features in this plan include that the state must: (1) declare that 
the it will report any sort of abuse of the child; (2) grant an individual the right to a “fair hearing” 
if the individual’s afforded benefits are denied; (3) make reasonable efforts to “preserve and reuni-
fy families”; (4) aid in the creation of a case plan for “each child receiving foster care maintenance 
payments”; and (5) make provisions for health insurance coverage for children with special needs. 
Id.  
 22 See id. § 671(a) (detailing the features necessary for a state’s plan to be approved by the 
Secretary which then makes the state eligible for federal reimbursement for “foster care mainte-
nance payments”). 
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system.23 The costs provided include expenses such as the child’s food, cloth-
ing, and shelter.24 The final relevant section of the Act details the process of 
how states will receive reimbursement from the federal government after 
providing maintenance payments to foster families. 25 
B. When Is a Right a Private Right? 
To determine whether a statute creates a privately enforceable right 
under § 1983, one must look to Congressional intent to determine whether 
the legislation was meant to “unambiguously” create a privately enforceable 
right.26 In 1997, in Blessing v. Freestone, the Supreme Court laid out three 
factors for courts to consider in assessing Congressional intent in this con-
text.27 First, Congress must have intended to benefit the plaintiff. Second, 
the right being conveyed must be clear and not “so vague and amorphous 
that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.” Third, the right 
must create a “binding obligation” for the states.28 To reach the determina-
tion that Congress intended to benefit the plaintiff, thereby satisfying the 
first factor, a court should conduct a three prong analysis, considering 
whether: (1) the statute contained “rights-creating language;” (2) the statute 
has an individual and not an “aggregate focus;” and (3) there is a “federal 
review mechanism.”29 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See id. § 672(a)(1) (mandating “foster care maintenance payments” for each child who has 
been removed from a relative’s home and placed into the foster care system). 
 24 See id. § 675(4)(A) (defining the term “foster care maintenance payments” as payments 
that provide for items such as “food, shelter, daily supervision, school supplies, a child’s personal 
incidentals, liability insurance with respect to a child, reasonable travel to the child’s home or 
visitation, and reasonable travel for the child to remain in the school in which the child is enrolled 
at the time of placement”). 
 25 See id. § 674(a) (explaining that states shall be reimbursed equal to the percentage of medi-
cal assistance required of the foster care maintenance payments). 
 26 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280, 282–83 (2002) (holding that a privately 
enforceable right is created when it can be determined that Congress intended to create that private 
right). 
 27 See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 (1997) (finding that where Congress in-
tended to benefit the plaintiff, the right conveyed is clear, and the right creates an obligation for 
the state, a privately enforceable right is created). 
 28 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 377 (citing Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340–41); see Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 
283 (clarifying the Blessing test in that it is “rights” and not “benefits” or “interests” that are en-
forced using § 1983); see also Barbara Vargo, Who Can Sue? The Sixth Circuit in D.O. v. Glisson 
Deepens the Split Over a Private Right of Action to Foster Care Maintenance Payments, 51 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 215, 218 (2017) (explaining that the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Glisson was 
based on the three factor test set forth in Blessing to decide if the statute created a privately en-
forceable right). 
 29 See Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1196–97 (citing Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287, 289–90) (finding that 
the first factor of the Blessing test is met when the statute contains “rights-creating language,” the 
statute does not have an “aggregate focus,” and there is no “federal review mechanism”). 
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In 2006, in Harris v. Olszewksi, the Sixth Circuit held that Medicaid’s 
“freedom-of-choice” provision was a privately enforceable right.30 In Har-
ris, Medicaid recipients argued that the statute’s freedom-of-choice provi-
sion created a privately enforceable right and sought to challenge the state 
of Michigan’s procedure for regulating incontinence products through Med-
icaid, which gave all distribution rights to a single distributor.31 After ana-
lyzing the three factors outlined above, the Sixth Circuit held that the provi-
sion allowed Medicaid users to choose their own healthcare sources; thus, it 
created a privately enforceable right.32 In Harris, the court reasoned that all 
three factors had been met, emphasizing that Congress intended the statute 
to benefit the individual because the freedom-of-choice provision included 
the language “any individual eligible for medical assistance.”33 Further-
more, the court determined that the provision was not “vague” or “amor-
phous” and that it created an obligatory duty, binding upon the state.34 
In contrast, in 2012, in Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Supreme Court 
held that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (“FERPA”) 
did not give students a privately enforceable right to keep their education rec-
ords private.35 Here, the Court found that the provision failed to satisfy the 
first factor of the Blessing test because the provision had no rights creating 
language, had an aggregate effect, and simply provided regulation to the Sec-
retary of Education.36 Thus, after assessing these three prongs and determin-
                                                                                                                           
 30 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (2012) (codifying the “freedom-of-choice” provision by 
stating that individuals eligible for Medicaid may receive medical assistance from any place certi-
fied to execute the services needed); Harris v. Olszewksi, 442 F.3d 456, 460 (6th Cir. 2006) (hold-
ing that Medicaid’s freedom-of-choice provision satisfied all three factors that are needed to con-
sider a privately enforceable right created). 
 31 Harris, 442 F.3d at 460. The plaintiffs pursued relief using § 1983, arguing that because the 
state only allowed a single provider to distribute incontinence products for Medicaid recipients in 
Michigan, the state was disobeying the freedom-of-choice provision. Id. 
 32 Id. at 460–61. The Sixth Circuit found that the Medicaid provision at question passed the 
three factors laid out in Blessing. Id. First, the court reasoned that by stating “any individual eligi-
ble for medical assistance,” the statute was intending to benefit the individual plaintiff, specifical-
ly beneficiaries that are eligible for Medicaid coverage. Id. at 461. Second, the mandate does not 
“contain the kind of vagueness that would push the limits of judicial enforcement.” Id. at 462. 
Finally, the statute uses mandatory terms like “must . . . provide” creating a “binding obligation” 
for the state. Id. 
 33 Id. at 461. 
 34 Id. at 462. 
 35 Compare id. at 460 (holding that as the statute at issue provided individuals the ability to 
choose any qualified provider or supplier, it was focused on the individual being benefited, thus 
creating a privately enforceable right), with Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 276, 287 (holding that where the 
statute simply regulated the state as an actor, it did not focus on the individual being benefited, 
thus failing to create a privately enforceable right). 
 36 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 290. The Court in Gonzaga clarified that § 1983 can only be used to 
enforce the “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Id. at 283. 
The court reasoned that the statute speaks directly to the Secretary of Education, simply directing 
his or her actions; there is no essence of the “individual entitlement” that § 1983 serves to enforce. 
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ing the first factor of the Blessing test was not met, the Court found that Con-
gress did not intend to benefit the plaintiff in question through FERPA.37 
C. The Presumption of § 1983 Enforceability 
Section 1983 serves as a mechanism to protect individual rights that 
have been secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.38 For a 
statute to be enforceable under § 1983, the statute must create a right for 
individuals, not simply consist of a law per the three part test in Blessing.39 
For example, Medicaid reimbursements have been found to comprise a pri-
vately enforceable right.40 Section 1983 is often used as an enforcement 
mechanism for individuals’ rights secured by the Constitution or the laws 
that do not have their own enforcement scheme in place.41  
Once it has been established that a private right was created by a spe-
cific statute, there becomes a rebuttable presumption that the right is en-
                                                                                                                           
Id. at 287. In addition, there is no “rights-creating language” that shows Congress’s intent to con-
vey a new right. Id.; see Vargo, supra note 28, at 228 (explaining that the court in Gonzaga decid-
ed that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (“FERPA”) did not create a pri-
vately enforceable rights because it lacked “rights-creating language,” focused largely on the Sec-
retary of Education and not the individual, and provided for a review board to investigate potential 
violations that provided the plaintiff with other ways to pursue his rights). 
 37 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287, 290–91. 
 38 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 285 (explaining that § 1983 is used to 
carry out rights “secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States”); Blessing, 520 U.S. at 
340 (noting that a plaintiff has to be enforcing a “federal right” and that § 1983 is not to be used to 
enforce an abuse of federal law). Section 1983 came into existence with the Civil Rights Act of 
1871. Bradford C. Mank, Suing Under § 1983: The Future After Gonzaga University v. Doe, 39 
HOUS. L. REV. 1417, 1426 (2003). Section 1983 assisted in preserving the civil rights of African 
Americans when former Confederates attempted to re-establish slavery. Id. In its beginning stages, 
§ 1983 only guaranteed “Constitutional rights” and did not refer to laws. Id. In 1874, Congress 
supplemented the statute with the verbiage “and laws.” Id. There was a lot of debate about what 
this additional verbiage added to the statute. Id. Finally, in 1980, the Supreme Court, in Maine v. 
Thiboutot, held that the meaning of the words “and laws” in the statute referred to “federal statuto-
ry rights”; consequently, the Court allowed private individuals who were intended to benefit from 
those rights to bring suit under § 1983. Id. at 1430. 
 39 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340 (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 
106 (1989)). See generally MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, SECTION 1983 
LITIGATION (Geoffrey Erwin et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008) (discussing the three Blessing factors that 
distinguish a federal right from a federal law); Barbara J. Van Arsdale et al., Civil Rights, in 15 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, SECOND EDITION § 69 (2018) (explaining that in order for a statute 
to be enforced using § 1983, it must be found that Congress planned for the statute to be a private-
ly enforceable right). 
 40 See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 514 (1990) (finding the Boren Amendment 
to be a privately enforceable right, reasoning that it satisfies all of the Blessing factors and that 
Congress did not set forth a sufficiently elaborate independent enforcement mechanism to disqual-
ify § 1983 enforcement mechanisms). 
41 Mank, supra note 38 at 1437. If a statute has an “unusually elaborate” enforcement mecha-
nism used to enforce compliance, then § 1983 cannot be used as an avenue for enforcement. Id. 
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forceable using § 1983.42 This presumption can be rebutted if a party shows 
Congress intended for § 1983 to not be available as a means of enforcement 
for the specific right at issue.43 Congress can close off § 1983 as an avenue 
for enforcement either “expressly” or “impliedly.”44 If Congress expressly 
closes off § 1983 by explicitly stating that it is not to be used as a remedy 
for a specific right, then § 1983 cannot be an option for enforceability.45 
Congress can also imply that a specific right is not to be enforced by § 1983 
by creating a “comprehensive enforcement scheme” that is not compatible 
with § 1983; although to date, courts have only interpreted this to have oc-
curred twice.46 If Congress is determined to have not closed off § 1983 en-
forceability, individuals can use § 1983 to protect the private right at issue.47 
Notably, the mere availability of an enforcement mechanism within a 
statute does not, in and of itself, defeat the possibility of § 1983 enforceabil-
                                                                                                                           
 42 See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341 (finding that dismissal is appropriate when Congress pur-
posely deprives the plaintiff of § 1983 as a remedy) 
 43 Id. The use of § 1983 is rarely rebutted, but, if it is rebutted, the defendant has to prove that 
Congress intended to “specifically foreclose” the use of § 1983 as an enforcement mechanism. 
Mank, supra note 38, at 1420.  
 44 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. For instance, in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 
the plaintiffs were fishermen off the coast of New York, and the Court found that the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”) could not be enforced using § 1983. Middlesex Cty. 
Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1981). The plaintiffs’ ability to 
harvest fish was diminishing due to water pollution; accordingly, they brought suit against multi-
ple government entities, stating that the government allowed companies to “dump” their polluted 
materials into the water. Id. at 4–5. The plaintiffs argued that this dumping was inconsistent with 
the FWPCA. Id. at 5 n.6. Looking to the intent of Congress in drafting and passing the FWPCA, 
the Supreme Court reasoned that the statute had “unusually elaborate enforcement” mechanisms. 
Id. at 13–14. The Court reasoned that because of the explicit enforcement mechanisms present 
within the FWPCA, Congress did not intend any other enforcement provisions to be used in con-
nection with the statute. Id.; see also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009, 1010–11 (1984) 
(holding that where “carefully tailored” administrative enforcement mechanisms that could be 
reviewed by the courts, if necessary, were present, those independent enforcement mechanisms 
were sufficient to find that Congress did not intend for § 1983 to be used as an enforcement mech-
anism for the Education of the Handicapped Act, as § 1983 would essentially make the independ-
ent enforcement mechanisms redundant). 
 47 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 521. The Supreme Court considered the question of whether § 1983 
could be used by healthcare providers to challenge a state’s Medicaid reimbursement procedures. 
Id. at 501. The plaintiff, the Virginia Hospital Association, filed suit against various Virginia offi-
cials arguing that Virginia’s reimbursement policy violates the Boren Amendment because the 
rates were neither economic nor efficient. Id. at 503. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, 
arguing that § 1983 was not the appropriate enforcement mechanism. Id. at 504. The defendants 
asserted that Virginia had provided an elaborate system to ensure efficient payments and that any 
individual could appeal their reimbursement rates. Id. at 520. Ultimately, the Court found that the 
systems that were put in place by Virginia were not elaborate enough to conclusively show con-
gressional intent to foreclose § 1983 enforceability. Id. at 522. 
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ity.48 In 1987, in Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 
the Supreme Court held that the “generalized powers” of the Secretary of 
Housing and Urban Development to investigate and enforce housing con-
tracts did not constitute an elaborate enough enforcement mechanism to cut 
off § 1983 enforceability.49 Thus, it is clear that where there are enforce-
ment mechanisms available, § 1983 enforceability is not automatically fore-
closed.50 In fact, to foreclose a privately enforceable right from § 1983, 
courts have determined that the enforcement mechanism Congress provides 
must be “unusually elaborate,” so that there is not a question of whether 
Congress aimed to have a secondary remedy through the use of § 1983.51 
II. FOSTER CARE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS: ARE THEY  
A PRIVATELY ENFORCEABLE RIGHT? 
 Section A of this Part discusses the merits and ruling of D.O. v. Glisson  
in regards to a privately enforceable right.52 Section B of this Part discusses 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 enforceability, the rebuttable presumption that is created, 
and discusses the Sixth Circuits ruling that the Child Welfare Act is en-
forceable using § 1983.53 Part C of this Section compares the Eighth Circuit 
ruling that the Child Welfare Act is not enforceable using § 1983.54  
A. D.O. v. Glisson: Foster Care Maintenance Payments  
Are a Privately Enforceable Right 
In D.O. v. Glisson, the state of Kentucky placed two boys into the fos-
ter care system after Kentucky’s Health and Family Services agency began 
a Dependency, Neglect, and Abuse proceeding against their mother in 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 347; see Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 
418, 428 (1987) (holding that the enforcement scheme was not elaborate enough to prove “con-
gressional intent” to impede § 1983 enforcement); Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S at 20 (find-
ing that where the enforcement scheme was “comprehensive” and there was little space for a 
§ 1983 action, a § 1983 action could not be used to bypass the already provided enforcement 
scheme). 
 49 Wright, 479 U.S. at 428; see Wilder, 496 U.S. at 522 (holding that the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services’ similar “generalized powers” to oversee Medicaid funding and reject specif-
ic plans could not be considered an elaborate enough enforcement mechanism to close off § 1983). 
 50 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 347. 
 51 See Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 13–14 (finding that where a statute contains unu-
sually elaborate enforcement provisions which allows authority to sue both individuals and the gov-
ernment, § 1983 cannot be used to enforced the act); Mank, supra note 8 at 1437 (stating that a 
§ 1983 suit is not appropriate if there is an “unusually elaborate” enforcement structure within the 
statute itself). 
 52 See infra notes 55–84 and accompanying text. 
 53 See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text. 
 54 See infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text. 
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2012.55 Shortly after the boys’ placement, the plaintiff, the mother’s aunt, 
pursued custody of the two children.56 The children were placed in the 
aunt’s care after Health and Family Services analyzed her home and con-
ducted a background check.57 In September 2014, the court granted joint 
custody to both the mother and aunt; however, the boys continued to live 
with their aunt.58 The aunt then filed a motion in family court, requesting 
foster care maintenance payments from the state of Kentucky.59 The family 
court did not directly rule on this issue.60 
The children’s aunt subsequently sued the Secretary of Kentucky’s Cab-
inet for Health and Family Services (the “Cabinet”) in federal court, contend-
ing that the Act required the state to pay her foster maintenance payments.61 
The district court granted the Cabinet’s motion for summary judgment, ex-
plaining that the Act provides no privately enforceable rights.62 The district 
court reasoned that 42 U.S.C. § 672(a) focused on “the persons or the institu-
tion being regulation,” and thus, it did not focus on “the individuals who ben-
efit.”63 The district court further stated that the statute does not “unambigu-
ously confer a right to support a cause of action.”64 The district court deter-
mined that the Act did not meet the first requirement necessary to create a 
privately enforceable right, as the statute does not indicate Congressional in-
tention to benefit the plaintiff.65 The aunt appealed this decision.66 
                                                                                                                           
 55 D.O. v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 376 (6th Cir. 2017); see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.070 
(West 2017) (codifying the process by which a Dependency, Neglect and Abuse proceeding is 
initiated—by the filing of a petitioner by an interested person and then service of a summons upon 
the parent); id. § 620.080 (codifying that a court proceeding will occur in which it will be deter-
mined if the child would be dependent, neglected or abused if left in the custody of the parent, and 
if so, they will be removed from the home). 
 56 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 376. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See id. (reasoning that because the children were placed in the permanent care of their aunt, 
the boys were no longer within the definition of “foster children,” and the issue was moot). 
 61 See id. (arguing further that the state’s failure to make these payments violated the Consti-
tution’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses). 
 62 See id. at 377 (finding that if there is no privately enforceable right, an individual cannot 
bring a § 1983 enforceability suit). 
 63 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (2012); see D.O. v. Beshear, No. 5:15-048-DCR, 2016 WL 1171532, 
at *5 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 23, 2016), rev’d sub nom. D.O. v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 375–76 (6th Cir. 
2017), cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 316 (2017) (finding that the children are the intended beneficiaries 
of the Act, but the Act itself is not termed in a way that focuses on the individual beneficiary). 
 64 D.O. v. Beshear, 2016 WL 1171532, at *5. 
 65 See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 (1997) (detailing that a right is privately 
enforceable if Congress designed the statute to benefit the plaintiff, the right is not so “vague and 
amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial competence,” and the statute creates a “bind-
ing obligation” for the states); D.O. v. Beshear, 2016 WL 1171532, at *6 (holding that the first 
factor of the Blessing test is not satisfied and the Act does not create a privately enforceable right). 
 66 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 376. 
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On appeal, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Act does in fact pro-
vide a privately enforceable right, as foster parents are owed foster care 
maintenance payments.67 The Sixth Circuit explained that, in order to find a 
privately enforceable right, Congress’s intention needs to be that the statute 
“benefit the plaintiff,” the right cannot be “so vague and amorphous” that 
implementing it would “strain judicial competence,” and the statute must 
“unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States.”68 
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the Act specifically intended to benefit 
foster care children.69 The state of Kentucky argued that the Act focused on 
the state, directing the state to regulate the payments and that the proof lies 
in the fact that the Act is written in the active voice.70 The court found, 
however, that an act written in the active voice does not necessarily pre-
clude a statutory provision from being aimed at benefitting the plaintiff.71 
The court reasoned that the provision states that payments are to be made 
“on behalf of each child,” thus focusing on benefiting specific individuals.72 
Turning to whether the Act’s language is too vague, the court found 
that the Act is not amorphous, but rather specifically lists all of the financial 
needs that the state is required to cover.73 The court further reasoned that the 
lack of specific monetary amounts that need to be paid to foster parents in 
the Act does not necessarily make the Act “vague” or “amorphous.”74 The 
Act details that the payments are to provide funding for items such as “food, 
clothing, shelter, [and] daily supervision.”75 The Act allows for some flexi-
bility on behalf of the foster parents regarding what brand of food they will 
purchase or where they will shop for clothing, so the Act cannot specify the 
exact costs of such purchases.76 These cost decisions are predicated by the 
stores near a family’s home, their particular preferences, and other similar 
                                                                                                                           
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 377 (citing Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340–41); see Harris v. Olszewksi, 442 F.3d 456, 
459–60 (2005) (holding that through the use of the three aforementioned factors, Medicaid’s 
“freedom-of-choice provision” creates a privately enforceable right). 
 69 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 378. 
 70 Id. at 378–79. Kentucky argued that 42 U.S.C. § 674(a)(1) uses an active voice because the 
subject, the state, performs the action of making foster care maintenance. Id. 
 71 See id. at 379 (detailing that the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have held that laws 
phrased in active voice can create a privately enforceable right). 
 72 Id. at 378 (distinguishing the facts in the current case from the facts in Gonzaga University 
v. Doe, where the act simply focused on regulating the governmental agency director, compared to 
the Act that focuses on the needs of the individual). 
 73 42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(a); Glisson, 847 F.3d at 378. 
 74 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 379. 
 75 42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(a). 
 76 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 379–80; see Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 495, 519 (1990) 
(“That the [statute] gives the States substantial discretion in choosing among reasonable methods 
of calculating rates may affect the standard under which a court reviews whether the rates comply 
with the [statute], but it does not render the [statute] unenforceable by a court.”). 
454 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
factors; yet, the court reasoned that this variability neither necessarily dis-
qualifies the Act nor does it make it so “vague” or “amorphous” that im-
plementation would “strain judicial competence.”77 
Finally, the court found that the Act explicitly dictated that the state 
“shall make” foster care maintenance payments and, therefore, creates a duty 
for the states to make payments to qualified applicants.78 Meanwhile, the state 
of Kentucky argued that Congress did not intend the Act to be binding on the 
states.79 Rather, the state argued that the Act provided as a list of things that 
could be completed if the state wanted to be reimbursed by the federal gov-
ernment.80 The state argued that nothing was actually required of it, as it 
could chose to forego the conditions set out in the Act and take on the full 
cost of the payments themselves.81 The court ultimately gave little weight to 
the state’s arguments because the Act explicitly explains in mandatory terms 
that a state “shall make foster care maintenance payments;” thus, the Act can-
not be interpreted as merely a roadmap.82 As a result, the court concluded that 
these payments are not voluntary; they are required.83 
The Sixth Circuit ultimately determined that the Act satisfies the three 
main requirements for an act to embody a privately enforceable right.84 
                                                                                                                           
 77 42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(A); Glisson, 847 F.3d at 378–79; see also Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519 (in-
ferring that because the statute does not specify the specific amounts to be spent on each item, 
those decisions are left to the discretion of the foster family). 
 78 See Glisson, 847 F.3d at 378–79 (reasoning that Congress used “rights creating language” 
and bound the state to an obligation to provide the “foster maintenance payments”); see also 
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 338 (finding that a statute creates a “binding obligation” if it describes what 
a state must do to obtain federal funding). 
 79 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 378–79. Although Kentucky makes this argument, they provide no 
support for it, and it is unlikely that any state has attempted to fund the foster care maintenance 
payments on their own. Id. See Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass’n v. Kincade, 712 F.3d 
1190, 1198 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding that 42 U.S.C. § 672(a) provides limitations for what types of 
foster care payments would be matched with federal funding but does not require that states make 
the payments to foster families). 
 80 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 379. Kentucky further argues that the Act was meant to serve as a 
“roadmap” if the states wanted to be reimbursed with federal monies. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) 
(detailing the process in which the state can be reimbursed for making foster care maintenance pay-
ments to foster families). 
 81 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 379.  
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 380; see Wilder, 496 U.S. at 514 (holding that because the Boren Amendment satis-
fies all three requirements, the act embodies a privately enforceable right); see also Cal. State 
Foster Parent Ass’n v. Wagner, 624 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Act is a pri-
vately enforceable right because it satisfies the three factors of the Blessing test, but not ruling on 
§ 1983 enforceability because the state did not rebut the presumption). 
2018] The Sixth Circuit Considers Private Enforceability of the Child Welfare Act 455 
B. The Rebuttable Presumption: The Sixth Circuit and § 1983 
There is a rebuttable presumption that the Act can be enforced using 
§ 1983 because the Sixth Circuit found that it creates a privately enforcea-
ble right.85 In Glisson, the Sixth Circuit held that the Act’s prescribed foster 
care maintenance payments are enforceable using § 1983.86 The court was 
not persuaded by the state of Kentucky’s argument that the Secretary’s re-
view of the plan served as an independent enforcement mechanism and ad-
equately protected the rights of affected individuals.87 The state argued that 
because the Secretary can review the plan, the case is analogous to Gonzaga 
University v. Doe, in which the Secretary of Education was “expressly au-
thorized” to mediate FERPA abuses.88 In Gonzaga, the Supreme Court 
found that the specific provision within FERPA did not create a privately 
enforceable right; therefore, it could not be enforced under § 1983.89 The 
Sixth Circuit distinguished the facts in Glisson from the facts in Gonzaga in 
its determination that the Act created a private right to foster maintenance 
payments, whereas FERPA did not create any such private right.90 
In Glisson, the Sixth Circuit decided that the oversight given to the 
Secretary is not elaborate enough to show that Congress intended to fore-
close § 1983 enforceability.91 Thus, the Act’s enforcement mechanisms, 
characterized by the court as weak, do not foreclose § 1983 enforceability.92 
C. The Eighth Circuit and the Unavailability of § 1983  
as an Enforcement Mechanism 
In Midwest Foster Care and Adoption Ass’n v. Kincade, the Eighth 
Circuit found that the Act was not “unambiguously” meant to benefit the 
plaintiff, failing the first factor of the test set forth in Blessing v. Free-
                                                                                                                           
 85 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 380 (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341). 
 86 See id. at 381 (reasoning that because there is neither evidence of congressional intent to 
foreclose § 1983 enforcement implicitly by creating a separate enforcement mechanism nor ex-
plicitly by stating that § 1983 cannot be used to enforce the Act, the Act can be enforced using 
§ 1983). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Compare id. at 380 (the Secretary has the power to “withhold funds to non-complying 
States”), with Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 289 (2002) (the Secretary of Education was 
“expressly authorized” to oversee FERPA abuses). 
 89 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 290–91. 
 90 See id. (finding that because FERPA’s enforcement procedures and federal review proce-
dures are sufficient, there is no private right to be enforced). 
 91 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 380. 
 92 See id. (explaining that the Secretary simply “reviews” the plan created by the state and is 
not given any actual authority to force the state to give foster care maintenance payments to foster 
care families and, therefore, the statute does not have any sort of enforcement mechanism). 
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stone.93 The Eighth Circuit found that because the Act does not contain 
what it considered to be any “rights-creating language,” the Act could not 
be deemed to provide a privately enforceable right.94 First, the court noted 
that the language present in the Act focuses on the state, which is the sub-
ject being regulated.95 The court likened the statute to FERPA in Gonzaga, 
which was considered “two steps removed from the interests of [the] indi-
vidual.”96 The court reasoned that the Act outlines the limitations on states 
and the types of spending that will be reimbursed with federal money, 
providing very little direct language about the interests of the foster chil-
dren.97 
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the definition of “foster care 
maintenance payments,” which lists what funds can be used for, does not 
necessarily create a privately enforceable right.98 Rather, the list found in 
§ 675(4)(A) of the Act serves as a “ceiling” through which Congress in-
tended to limit state reimbursements.99 Additionally, § 672(a)(1) states the 
conditions that must be met prior to initiating the need for foster mainte-
nance payments.100 Additionally, the court found that the Act has an “aggre-
gate” focus, as the statute links the provision of federal funding to “substan-
tial compliance” by the state.101 Moreover, each time an individual right is 
stated, the court determined that the language illustrates what actions pro-
hibit federal reimbursement, which further proves an aggregate focus.102 In 
the end, the Eighth Circuit determined that Congress did not “unambiguous-
                                                                                                                           
 93 Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1203; see Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340 (holding that in order for a right 
to be a privately enforceable right, the first factor that must be met is that “Congress must have 
intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff”). 
 94 Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1197. 
 95 Id.; see also Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287 (finding that statutes focused on the individual being 
regulated, instead of the individual being benefitted, do not contain rights-creating language). 
 96 See Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1197 (holding that the focus of the Act is too “removed” from the 
interests of the foster parents); see also Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287 (finding that where a statute’s 
regulations are too “removed” from the interests of the person who benefits from the statute, the 
statute does not create a privately enforceable right). 
 97 See Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1197–98 (finding that when a statute is focused on telling the 
states what they must do to receive federal funding, that statute is unlikely to create a privately 
enforceable right). 
 98 Id. at 1198. 
 99 42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(A); Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1197. 
 100 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1); see Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1198 (finding that the Act generally 
serves as a “roadmap,” which a state can follow if it wants its funds to be matched by federal 
money). If the state does not want to follow this roadmap, the state must provide these payments 
on its own. Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1197. 
 101 42 U.S.C. 672(a); see Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1200–01 (stating that one factor that shows a 
statute has an aggregate focus is when a statute is centered around “substantial compliance”). 
 102 See Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1201 (explaining that when the Supreme Court has found a stat-
ute to create a privately enforceable right, these referenced statutes have not been “ensconced” 
with language that “triggers . . . a funding prohibition”).  
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ly confer” a privately enforceable right of foster care maintenance payments, 
and thus, the Act cannot be enforced under § 1983.103 
III. THE FUTURE OF THE ACT AND § 1983 ENFORCEABILITY 
 Section A of this Part reiterates that the Child Welfare Act is not a pri-
vately enforceable act and explains the reasoning.104 Section B of this Part 
explains that the Sixth Circuit’s ruling might have been based on policy rea-
soning, rather than statutory interpretation.105 Section C concludes this Part 
by arguing that the power to correct this problem rests with Congress.106  
A. The Child Welfare Act is Not a Privately Enforceable Right 
Though the Act was enacted to protect the foster care system and to 
ensure foster care maintenance payments, the Act’s text does not demon-
strate Congress’s “unambiguous intent” to create a privately enforceable 
right.107 Understandably, this conclusion should invoke some emotion, be-
cause it means that an individual taking in a foster care child may be left 
without legal recourse if they do not receive the monetary help that they 
need to get by.108 It is a fundamental rule that courts must follow the pre-
scribed tests rather than legislate from the bench.109 Here, following the test 
agreed upon by the Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freestone, it is clear that 
the Act fails the first of the three factors because the verbiage included in 
the Act does not show Congress’s unambiguous intent to benefit the plain-
tiff.110 As the Eighth Circuit demonstrates, there is no “rights creating lan-
                                                                                                                           
 103 Id. at 1203. 
 104 See infra notes 107-118 and accompanying text. 
 105 See infra notes 119-125 and accompanying text. 
 106 See infra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.  
 107 42 U.S.C. § 672(a) (2012); see Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass’n v. Kincade, 712 
F.3d 1190, 1203 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that there is no proof to show that Congress did “unam-
biguously confer” a privately enforceable right). 
 108 Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1203. 
 109 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568, 570 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining that the role of the court is to “preserve society’s values” and not to “revise” society’s 
values). Furthermore, courts cannot create tests to change the laws; they must only “evaluate” 
statutes. See generally Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and a Defense, 
11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185 (2007) (discussing the critiques of “legislating from the bench”). 
 110 See Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1202 (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290–91 
(2002)) (finding that the Act does not satisfy the first factor of the Blessing test); see also Blessing 
v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (explaining that an act is a privately enforceable right if 
Congress intended to benefit the plaintiff, the right being conveyed is clear and not “so vague and 
amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial competence,” and the right creates a “bind-
ing obligation” for the states). 
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guage” apparent within the Act.111 Though ultimately foster children are the 
beneficiaries of the Act, the contents of 42 U.S.C. § 672 are largely focused 
on the “institution being regulated” and contain the layout of the conditions 
that trigger the federal government’s reimbursement.112 While the Sixth 
Circuit reasoned that the Act is focused on the child because it explicitly 
states “on behalf of each child,” it ignored the express language in the be-
ginning of the Act directed toward the states.113 In fact, the Act speaks 
largely to the states, beginning, “[e]ach state with a plan approved under 
this part”114 Thus, the language of the Act is not primarily focused on indi-
vidual foster parents, but instead focused instead on what states need to do 
to be eligible for reimbursement by the federal government.115 
Additionally, because the Act has an “aggregate focus,” rather than an 
individual focus, it cannot be said to create a privately enforceable right.116 As 
illustrated in Gonzaga University v. Doe, proof of an aggregate focus can be 
found if an act is determined not to be focused on if the “needs” of a specific 
person were met and if the text of the Act “triggers” the prevention of repay-
ment.117 Assessing the Act through this lens, the majority of § 672 is focused 
on whether the state plan “substantially conforms” to the statute.118 
                                                                                                                           
 111 See Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1197 (finding that because the Act focuses on the state as the 
entity being regulated and not on the individual being benefited, the Act does not include any 
“rights creating language”); see also Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287 (finding that the presence of rights 
creating language in a statute is evidence that Congress intended the statute to benefit the particu-
lar plaintiff). 
 112 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287–88; D.O. v. Beshear, No. 5:15-048-DCR, 2016 WL 1171532, at 
*5 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 23, 2016) rev’d sub nom. D.O. v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 375–76 (6th Cir. 
2017). 
 113 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 378; see 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (“Each State with a plan approved 
under this part . . . .”).  
 114 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1); see Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1198 (finding that the Act largely focuses 
on what a state needs to do in order to be reimbursed and serves as a roadmap for states to follow). 
 115 See 42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(a) (detailing the list of items and services that can be paid for by 
the state and reimbursed by the federal government); Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1198 (finding that the 
Act simply sets out what states can be reimbursed for and the process by which reimbursement 
occurs). 
 116 See Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1200 (finding that the Act creates a link between compliance 
with conditions and reimbursement and, therefore, has an aggregate focus); see also Gonzaga, 536 
U.S. at 288 (finding that a statute with an “aggregate focus” cannot create a privately enforceable 
right). 
 117 See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288–89 (further detailing that a statute with an “aggregate fo-
cus” does not “give rise to individual rights); Blessing, 520 U.S. at 344 (finding that if there is not 
“substantial compliance” of Title IV-D, the Secretary cannot force the states to comply, but in-
stead this merely is a “trigger” that allows the Secretary to decrease the amount of money repaid 
to the state). 
 118 42 U.S.C. § 672; Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1198. 
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B. What About the Sixth Circuit’s Ruling?  
The text of the Act appears to not create a privately enforceable right, 
yet the Sixth Circuit found it did, allowing for privately enforcement under 
§ 1983.119 One potential factor in the Sixth Circuit’s analysis is that if the 
Act is not a privately enforceable right, then there is no way to ensure that 
states follow proper procedures or that foster parents are given the money 
needed to support their children.120 The Act does not provide independent 
private enforcement, and without § 1983, it is not clear how a harmed indi-
vidual could seek assistance.121 For instance, if an individual took in a foster 
child anticipating reliance on the foster care maintenance payments, but 
then did not receive those payments, that situation could have a substantial-
ly negative effect on the welfare of the child.122 Congress likely intended for 
the foster care maintenance payments to include a privately enforceable 
right, as the welfare of this nation’s children has been and will continue to 
be an important issue. 123 Without foster care maintenance payments, foster 
parents may be less likely to take in foster children simply because they do 
not have the funds to provide for them.124 Although Congress’s intent may 
have been to create a privately enforceable right, the text of the Act does not 
unambiguously express any such intent to create a privately enforceable 
right as required by the Blessing test. 125 
C. The Solution Lies with Congress 
Congress should amend the Act to demonstrate a clear commitment to 
the safety and welfare of the nation’s children by creating a privately enforce-
                                                                                                                           
 119 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288–89; Blessing, 520 U.S. at 244; Glisson, 847 F.3d at 381.  
 120 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 381; see Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340 (finding that § 1983 enforceability 
is only available to enforce a privately enforceable right, not merely a federal law). It has been 
found that 20% of children in foster care live in poverty, meaning that the foster families that they 
live with are below the poverty line. Jessica Pac et al., Poverty Among Foster Children: Estimates 
Using the Supplemental Poverty Measure, 91 SOC. SERV. REV. 8, 22 (2017). 
 121 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 381; see 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (stating that the Secretary has the 
ability to review the foster care maintenance plan, but there is no “elaborate enforcement mecha-
nism” provided in the statute). 
 122 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1); Glisson, 847 F.3d at 381. Foster care children most often come 
from poor neighborhoods, single-family homes, and have had exposure to things such as sub-
stance abuse and instability. Pac, supra note 114, at 9–10. 
 123 HOUSE WAYS & MEANS COMM., supra note 14. Given Congress’s commitment to the 
welfare of our nation’s children, it seems likely that they would want individuals to be able to 
enforce the Act. Id. 
 124 See Glisson, 847 F.3d at 381 (finding there was no federal mechanism for enforcement 
present within the Act and that without § 1983 enforcement, foster parents may not be able to 
afford taking foster children in). 
 125 See Kincade, 712 F.3d at 1202 (the Act fails the Blessing test largely because there was no 
“clear and unambiguous” congressional intent to create a privately enforceable right). 
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able right.126 This issue should not be left to the courts, as presently the ap-
propriate interpretation leaves individuals no recourse.127 Congress should 
resolve the ambiguities by either molding the Act into a statute that satisfies 
the Blessing test or by detailing an independent private enforcement mecha-
nism by which foster care parents can ensure their right to foster care mainte-
nance payments.128 Thereafter, courts can find this right is privately enforcea-
ble under § 1983, or an independent private enforcement mechanism would 
allow individuals, such as the aunt in D.O. v. Glisson, who have had foster 
care payments wrongfully withheld to receive justice.129 
CONCLUSION 
When the Sixth Circuit determined that the Act was a privately en-
forceable right, enforceable using § 1983, it is possible the court compro-
mised its analysis to justify the end result. Despite ambiguous text, the court 
concluded that foster care maintenance payments comprise a private right, 
enforceable using § 1983. Assessing the same Act, the Eight Circuit held 
that foster care maintenance payments did not comprise a privately enforce-
able right and, thus, cannot be enforced using § 1983. Although the result of 
the Eighth Circuit’s decision is detrimental to foster parents and seemingly 
not in line with Congressional and national sentiments because foster par-
ents may not have judicial remedies for states improperly withholding pay-
ments, the analysis correctly applies the Blessing factors for determining 
what is an individual right. The Eighth Circuit appropriately captured the 
role of courts to interpret the law, rather than supersede legislative authority. 
Because there is no way for the courts to circumvent Congress and find that 
the Act does create a privately enforceable right, Congress should amend 
the Act to ensure that the verbiage shows Congressional intent to create a 
privately enforceable right. This can be done by including language that 
“benefits the plaintiff,” making the Act not so “vague and amorphous that 
                                                                                                                           
 126 42 U.S.C. § 672. See generally Peabody, supra note 103 (explaining that Judges should 
not legislate from the bench, rather it is Congress’s job to pass necessary legislation). 
 127 See Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 13–14 
(1981) (finding an elaborate enforcement mechanism to force compliance with the FWCPA). 
Here, § 672 contains no such enforcement mechanism; therefore, without the ability to enforce 
this right using § 1983, there is no way to ensure that states will comply and give the necessary 
funds to the foster parents. 42 U.S.C. § 672. 
 128 See Glisson, 847 F.3d at 381 (finding that the Act can be enforced using § 1983 because 
using the factors set out in Blessing, the Act creates a privately enforceable right); Kincade, 712 
F.3d (finding that the Act cannot be enforced using § 1983 because the Act fails the first factor of 
the Blessing test). 
 129 See Glisson, 847 F.3d at 380–81 (explaining that the Act provides no review mechanisms 
and, thus, the only way that a foster family who has been withheld foster maintenance payments 
can challenge the state’s action is through the use of § 1983). 
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its enforcement would strain judicial competence,” and clearly stating that it 
is mandatory for states to pay the foster maintenance payments. Once these 
three factors are clear in the statute, individuals will be able to sue to en-
force their right to foster maintenance payments. 
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